Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Kethuboth

Folio 48a

R. Eliezer b. Jacob interpreted: [The expressions] She'erah kesutha,¹  [imply]: Provide her with raiment according to her age, viz. that a man shall not provide his old wife²  [with the raiment] of a young one nor his young wife with that of an old one. [The expressions], Kesutha we- 'Onatha³  [imply.] Provide her with raiment according to the season of the year,⁴  viz. that he shall not give her new raiment⁵  in the summer nor worn out raiment⁶  in the winter.⁷  R. Joseph learnt: Her flesh⁸  implies close bodily contact,⁹  viz, that he must not treat her in the manner of the Persians who perform their conjugal duties in their clothes. This provides support for [a ruling of] R. Huna who laid down that a husband who said, 'I will not [perform conjugal duties] unless she wears her clothes and I mine', must divorce her and give her also her kethubah.

R. JUDAH RULED: EVEN THE POOREST MAN IN ISRAEL etc. This¹⁰  then implies that the first Tanna is of the opinion that these¹¹  are not [necessary]. But how is one to imagine [the case]? If these¹¹  were required by the woman's status,¹²  what [it may be objected could be] the reason of the first Tanna who ruled [that these¹¹  were] not [required]? And if these¹¹  were not required by the woman's status,¹³  what [it may be objected could be] the reason of R. Judah? — [The ruling was] necessary only [in a case], for instance, where these were demanded by his status but not by hers. The first Tanna is of the opinion that the principle that she¹⁴  rises with him¹⁵  but does not go down with him¹⁶  is applied only during her lifetime¹⁷  but not after her death, while R. Judah maintains [that the principle applies] even after her death. R. Hisda laid down in the name of Mar 'Ukba that the halachah is in agreement with R. Judah.

R. Hisda further stated in the name of Mar 'Ukba: If a man became insane Beth din take possession¹⁸  of his estate and provide food and clothing for his wife, sons and daughters, and for anything else.¹⁹  Said Rabina to R. Ashi: Why should this²⁰  be different from that concerning which it was taught: If a man went to a country beyond the sea and his wife claimed maintenance, Beth din take possession of²¹  his estate and provide food and clothing for his wife, but not for his sons and daughters or for anything else?²²  The other replied: Do you not draw a distinction between one who departs²³  deliberately and one who departs²⁴  without knowing it?²⁵

What [is meant by] 'anything else'? — R. Hisda replied: Cosmetics were meant,²⁶  R. Joseph explained: Charity. According to him who replied, 'Cosmetics', the ruling²⁷  would apply with even greater force to charity.²⁸  He, however, who explained, 'charity' [restricts his ruling²⁷  to this alone] but cosmetics [he maintains] must he given to her, for [her husband] would not be pleased that she shall lose her comeliness.

R. Hiyya b. Abin stated in the name of R. Huna: If a man went to a country beyond the sea, and his wife died, Beth din take possession²⁹  of his estate and bury her in a manner befitting the dignity of his status. [You say] 'In a manner befitting the dignity of his status', and not that of her status!³⁰  — Read, In a manner befitting his status also; and it is this that he³¹  informs us: She rises with him [in his dignity] but does not go down with him [to a lower status] even after her death.

R. Mattena ruled: A man³²  who gave instructions that when [his wife] died she shall not be buried at the expense of his estate must be obeyed.³³  What, however, is the reason [for obeying the man] when he has left instructions? Obviously because the estate falls to the orphans;³⁴  but the estate falls to the orphans, does it not, even if he left no instructions?³⁵  — [The proper reading], however, is: A man³²  who gave instructions that when he dies be shall not be buried at the expense of his estate³⁶  is not to be obeyed, for it is not within his power³⁷  to enrich his sons and throw himself upon the public.

MISHNAH. SHE³⁸  REMAINS³⁹  UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF HER FATHER⁴⁰  UNTIL SHE ENTERS

1. [H] (Ex. XXI, 10), 'her age, her raiment'. [H] = flesh (cf. supra note 8), hence 'body', 'age'.
2. Lit., 'to her'.
3. [H] (Ex. XXI, 10), 'her raiment and her time' [H] = 'time', 'season'.
4. Lit., 'her season'.
5. Which might be too warm for her in the hot weather.
6. Being worn thin they would not provide sufficient protection from cold.
7. Lit., 'in the days of the rains'.
8. Cf. supra p. 273, n. 6.
9. Lit., 'nearness of flesh'.
10. Since the ruling is attributed to R. Judah.
11. Two flutes and one lamenting woman.
12. Lit. 'that it is her (sc. her family's) custom'.
13. Cf. supra n. 8 mutatis mutandis.
14. A wife.
15. Her husband.
16. I.e., enjoys his advantages but does not suffer his disadvantages.
17. As in the instance dealt with infra 61a.
18. Lit., 'go down into'.
19. This is explained infra.
20. The case dealt with by R. Huna.
21. This is explained infra.
22. Infra 107a.
23. From his home to a foreign country.
24. From society. sc. becomes insane.
25. In the former case the man could have left instructions, if he were minded to do so, that his wife and family should be provided for. Since, however, he left no such instructions, it is obvious that he had no intention of providing for them. Hence the ruling that his wife, whom he is under a legal obligation to maintain, (her claim being secured on his estate in accordance with the terms of her kethubah) must be provided for by the Beth din out of his estate; not however, his sons and daughters who have no legal claim upon their father's estate. Where, however, a man becomes insane it may well be assumed that it was his wish that both his wife and family shall be properly provided for out of his estate.
26. Lit., 'this'.
27. Of the Baraitha that 'anything else' was not to be provided for.
28. Since the court which has no right to provide from a man's estate for his own wife's personal enjoyments would have much less power to exact from that estate for charity.
29. Lit., 'go down into'.
30. Why should she suffer indignity on account of his lower status?
31. R. Huna.
32. While in a dying condition. The instructions of a dying man have the force of a legally written document.
33. Having survived her husband and collected her kethubah a wife has no further claim upon his estate which is consequently inherited by his sons.
34. Cf. supra n. 2.
35. And they, of course, are under no obligation to bury the widow.
36. But at the public cost.
37. Lit., 'all from him'.
38. A na'arah (v. Glos.). This Mishnah is a continuation of the previous one, supra 46b.
39. [H], lit., 'for ever', 'always'.
40. Even after her betrothal. He is entitled to all his privileges; and,' if she is the daughter of an Israelite, although betrothed to a priest, terumah is forbidden to her.

UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF HER HUSBAND¹  [BY GOING INTO THE BRIDAL CHAMBER]²  AT MARRIAGE. IF HER FATHER DELIVERED HER TO THE AGENTS OF THE HUSBAND³  SHE PASSES⁴  UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF HER HUSBAND. IF HER FATHER WENT WITH HER HUSBAND'S AGENTS⁵  OR IF THE FATHER'S AGENTS WENT WITH THE HUSBAND'S AGENTS⁵  SHE REMAINS⁴  UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF HER FATHER. IF HER FATHER'S AGENTS DELIVERED HER TO HER HUSBAND'S AGENTS⁶  SHE PASSES⁴  UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF HER HUSBAND.

GEMARA. What [is the purport of] REMAINS?⁷  — To exclude [the ruling] of an earlier⁸  Mishnah where we learned: If the respective periods⁹  expired¹⁰  and they were not married¹¹  they are entitled to maintenance out of the man's estate¹²  and [if he is a priest]¹³  may also eat terumah.¹⁴  Therefore 'REMAINS'¹⁵  was used.¹⁶

IF HER FATHER DELIVERED HER TO THE AGENTS OF THE HUSBAND SHE PASSES UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF HER HUSBAND etc. Rab ruled: Her delivery [is regarded as entry into the bridal chamber] in all respects¹⁷  except that of terumah;¹⁸  but R. Assi ruled in respect of terumah also.

R. Huna, (or as some Say, Hiyya b. Rab,) raised an objection against R. Assi: She remains¹⁵  under the authority of her father until she enters the bridal chamber.¹⁹  'Did I not tell you', said Rab to them,²⁰  'that you should not be guided by an ambiguous statement?²¹  He²²  can answer you that "her delivery" is regarded as her entry into the bridal chamber'.

Samuel, however, ruled: [Her delivery has the force of entry into the bridal chamber only in respect] of her inheritance.²³  Resh Lakish ruled: [Only in respect] of her kethubah.²⁴  What is meant by 'her kethubah'? [If it means] that should [the woman] die he inherits it,²⁵  [then this ruling is, is it not,] the same as that of Samuel?²⁶  Rabina replied: The meaning is²⁷  that her [statutory] kethubah from a second husband²⁸  is only a maneh.²⁹

Both R. Johanan and R. Hanina ruled: Her delivery [is regarded as entry into the bridal chamber] in all respects. even that of terumah.³⁰

An objection was raised: If the father went with the agents of the husband, or if the agents of the father went with the agents of the husband, or if she had a court-yard on the way, and she entered it with him³¹  to rest there for the night,³²  her father inherits from her if she died, although her kethubah³³  is already in the house of her husband. If, however, her father delivered her to her husband's agents, or if her father's agents delivered her to her husband's agents, or he³⁴  had a court-yard on the way, and she entered it with him with an intention to matrimony, her husband is her heir if she died, although her kethubah³³  was still in her father's house.³⁵  This ruling³⁶  applies only in respect of her inheritance³⁷  but in respect of terumah [the law is that] no woman is allowed to eat terumah until she enters the bridal chamber.³⁸  [Does not this represent] a refutation of all?³⁹  This is indeed a refutation.

[But] is not this,⁴⁰  however, self-contradictory? You said. 'She entered it with him to rest for the night'. The reason [why such an act is not regarded as entry into the bridal chamber is] because [the entrance was made specifically for the purpose of] resting for the night. Had it, however, been made with no specified intention [it would be deemed to have been made] with an intention to matrimony. Read, however, the final clause: 'She entered it with him with an intention to matrimony', from which it follows, does it not, that if the entrance was made with no specified intention [it would be deemed to have been made just] in order to rest there for the night? — R. Ashi replied: Both entrances mentioned⁴¹  are such as were made with no specified intention, but any unspecified [entrance into] a court-yard of hers [is presumed to have been made] in order to rest there for the night while any unspecified [entrance into] a court-yard of his⁴²  [is presumed to have been made] with an intention to matrimony.

A Tanna taught: If a father delivered [his daughter]⁴³  to the agents of her husband and she played the harlot⁴⁴  her penalty is that⁴⁵  of strangulation.⁴⁶  Whence is this ruling deduced? — R. Ammi b. Hama replied: Scripture stated,⁴⁷  To play the harlot in her father's house,⁴⁸  thus excluding one whom the father had delivered to the agents of the husband.

Might it not be suggested that this⁴⁸  excludes one who entered her bridal chamber but with whom no cohabitation had taken place?⁴⁹  — Raba replied: Ammi told me [that a woman⁵⁰  who entered her] bridal chamber was explicitly⁵¹  mentioned in Scripture: If there be a damsel that is a virgin betrothed unto a man;⁵²  'a damsel' but not a woman who is adolescent, 'a virgin' 'but not a woman with whom intercourse took place, 'betrathed' but not one married.⁵³  Now what [is meant by] 'one married'? If it be suggested: One actually married, [it can be objected that such a deduction]⁵⁴  would be practically the same as that of 'a virgin but not one with whom intercourse took place'. Consequently it must be concluded⁵⁵  [that by 'married' was meant one] who entered into the bridal chamber but with whom no intercourse took place.⁵⁶

1. Var. lec. 'to the bridal chamber' (v. Tosaf. 48a, s.v. [H]).
2. Huppah (v. Glos.); cf. Rashi, a.l. and cf. supra n. 10.
3. Who were sent to bring her from her father's house to that of her husband.
4. Lit., 'behold she is'.
5. To her husband's house.
6. Neither they nor her father who sent them accompanying her to the house of her husband.
7. [H], lit., 'for ever', 'always'. The omission of [H] would not in any way alter the actual ruling except the wording which would then read, 'She is under' etc. Why then was an apparently superfluous word inserted?
8. Lit., 'first'.
9. One of twelve months for a virgin and of thirty days for a widow (from the date their intended husbands claimed them) in which to prepare their marriage outfits.
10. Lit., 'the time arrived'.
11. Through their future husbands' delay or neglect.
12. Lit., 'eat of his'.
13. Though they are daughters of Israelites.
14. Infra 57a.
15. V. note I.
16. Sc. despite the expiry of the prescribed period a daughter REMAINS UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF HER FATHER UNTIL etc. and is consequently forbidden to eat terumah (cf. supra p. 276, n. 9).
17. Sc. the man obtains all the privileges to which a husband is entitled from the moment the bride enters the bridal chamber (e.g., the right to her handiwork, heirship).
18. The woman, if she is the daughter of an Israelite, is forbidden to eat it though the man is a priest (v. infra 57b).
19. And until then she is forbidden to eat terumah (cf. supra p. 276, n. 9). How then could R. Assi maintain that terumah is permitted to her?
20. His disciple R. Huna and his son Hiyya.
21. [H], lit., 'reverse'.
22. Sc. R. Assi. MS.M., T.
23. I.e., if she died on the way between her father's house and that of her husband, her dowry (given to her by her father) is inherited by her husband although he is not entitled to his other rights until her entrance into the bridal chamber.
24. This is explained anon.
25. Viz., the dowry her father gave her which forms one of the entries in her kethubah.
26. V. p. 277 n. 17
27. Lit., 'to say'.
28. If her first husband died while she was on the way with his agents.
29. V. Glos. The amount prescribed for a widow. A virgin is entitled to two hundred zuz.
30. Cf. supra p. 277. n. 12 mutatis mutandis.
31. Her husband.
32. With no matrimonial intention.
33. I.e., the dowry her father gave her.
34. Her husband.
35. I.e., the objects specifically assigned to her as dowry were still in her father's house.
36. That delivery to the husband's agents has the force of a marriage.
37. V. supra p. 277, n. 17.
38. Tosef. Keth. IV.
39. Lit., 'all of them', those (with the exception of Samuel) whose rulings differ from this Baraitha.
40. The Baraitha last mentioned.
41. In the first and second clauses.
42. Her husband.
43. Cf. supra p. 276, n. 7.
44. Prior to her entry into the bridal chamber.
45. Lit., 'behold this'.
46. Like that of a married woman; not stoning which is the penalty of one betrothed.
47. In prescribing the penalty of stoning.
48. Deut. XXII, 21.
49. What proof is there that one who had not even entered the bridal chamber is also excluded?
50. Prior to marriage
51. I.e., is deduced from a specific expression.
52. Deut. XXII, 23.
53. V. Sanh. 66b.
54. Betrothed but not actually married'.
55. Lit., 'but not?'
56. Since this text excluded such a case from the penalty of stoning no other text is required for the same purpose. Deut. XXII, 21, is consequently free for the deduction made by R. Ammi.